A District Court judge in New York has denied a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act case, ruling there is no written requirement to communicating information about a debt with a third party.
The Background: The plaintiff rented an apartment in New York City, but vacated it before the lease was up due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The debt was placed with the defendant for collection, seeking two month’s rent.
- A representative of the defendant sent an email to the plaintiff’s mother and then spoke with her via telephone. Neither of the plaintiff’s parents were involved with signing the lease for the apartment.
- The defendant did not obtain written authorization from the defendant to speak with his parents, but the representative of the defendant claims that during a telephone conversation with the plaintiff prior to the email being sent or call being placed, the plaintiff expressly authorized the representative to contact his parents.
The Ruling: Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA prohibits communicating information about a debt with third parties, except in certain circumstances — such as speaking with the consumer’s attorney, a consumer reporting agency, or the creditor.
- The plaintiff claims the defendant violated this section of the FDCPA by contacting his mother without his permission to do so. The problem, for the plaintiff, is that this section of the FDCPA does not state that the plaintiff’s written consent is required. While there are sections of the FDCPA that have a written component — Section 1692c(c) for example requires collectors to cease communicating with consumers if a consumer notifies the collector in writing that the consumer is refusing to pay the debt or wants the collector to stop communicating.
- In this case, oral consent is sufficient and that is what the defendant said it had when it contacted the plaintiff’s parents, noted Judge Analisa Torres of the District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- The plaintiff also claimed the defendant’s conduct violated Sections 1692b, 1692d, 1692e, and 1682f of the FDCPA, but each claim was based on the same communication with the plaintiff’s parents. One call and one email does not constitute harassment, there was nothing false or misleading about the communications, and there was nothing unconscionable discussed, Judge Torres ruled.
