A Magistrate Court judge in Texas has recommended that a defendant’s motion to dismiss a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act be granted after it was sued for sending a letter to the plaintiff who had indicated that the only convenient way to contact him was via email.
The Background: The defendant sent the plaintiff a letter last September about a debt. The plaintiff sent a letter back to the defendant, requesting verification of the debt and notifying the defendant that the only convenient way to contact the plaintiff was via email. The defendant sent another letter back to the plainitff that verified the debt that was owed.
- The plaintiff filed suit, alleging the defendant’s actions violated the FDCPA because it communicated with the plaintiff via letter after receiving notice that the plaintiff could only be contacted via email.
- The defendant filed its motion to dismiss, arguing the plaintiff lacked standing and that he failed to state a claim.
The Ruling: After first determining the plaintiff had standing to sue, Judge Christine L. Stetson of the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas then turned to whether the plaintiff stated a claim for which he could sue.
- The defendant argued that the plaintiff did not plead that the second letter he received was received at an inconvenient time or place, that the FDCPA requires collectors to mail responses when verifying debts, the second letter was not a collection letter because it did not make a demand for payment, which is required under the cited provision of the FDCPA, and because the letter falls under two regulatory exceptions to the cited provision.
- While the plaintiff implies all non-email communications are inconvenient, he did not allege that he would find receiving an email at his home at the same time the letter was received at his home to be inconvenient, meaning his dispute is with the chosen medium of communication, Judge Stetson ruled. The plaintiff’s preference for email communications “falls outside the scope of his right to limit the time and place of communications from the debt collector under the FDCPA and under the caselaw of this circuit,” she wrote.
