In a case that was defended by the team at Martin Golden Lyons Watts Morgan, a District Court judge in Oklahoma has granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act case, ruling the defendant did not violate the statute when it contacted the plaintiff and left a voicemail at roughly the same time of day that the plaintiff had previously indicated that it wasn’t “a good time to talk.”
The background: The plaintiff received a call from the defendant last May at 3:29pm. A month later, the defendant called the plaintiff again, at 3:04pm. During that call, the plaintiff said to the representative of the defendant, “I’m at work[,] and it’s not a good time to talk.” The representative responded, “just call us back for payment arrangement or settlement for you to pay this off once and for all.”
- A few weeks later, the defendant called the plaintiff again, this time at 3:22pm. When the plaintiff didn’t answer the call, the defendant left a voicemail attempting to collect on the debt and requested the plaintiff call the defendant back.
- A few days later, at 3:26pm, the plaintiff called the defendant and after being informed that the call was an attempt to collect a debt, the plaintiff replied, “I’m at work[,] and it’s not a good time to talk.”
- The plaintiff filed suit, accusing the defendant of violating Section 1692c(a)(1) and 1692c(a)(3) when it attempted to call the plaintiff and left a voicemail message.
The ruling: Because the plaintiff did not inform the defendant that communication at the time at which the calls were made wad inconvenient or “present any basis to find that Defendant knew or should have known” that the calls were being made at an inconvenient time, Judge Charles B. Goodwin of the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
- The plaintiff also failed to make a “plausible inference of such knowledge on the part of the defendant,” Judge Goodwin wrote.
- The judge also determined that the defendant did not contact the plaintiff at her place of employment because it called her on her cell phone when she happened to be at work. “… Plaintiff’s allegation that she checked her voicemail and returned Defendant’s phone call during a time that she stated she ‘was at work’ more plausibly establishes that Plaintiff was permitted to engage in such communications while at her place of employment,” Judge Goodwin noted.
