A District Court judge in Kansas has denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act case, ruling the plaintiff’s claim of having to spend “additional time, effort, and expense” in informing the defendant a second time that she was disputing her debt is enough for her to have standing to pursue her claims.
The background: The defendant, a debt collector, attempted to collect the debt in question through, among other means, furnishing information about the debt to the credit reporting agencies and by having another collector send a demand letter via email.
- The plaintiff’s attorney responded, disputing the validity of the debt. When the plaintiff later reviewed her credit report and discovered that the debt was still being reported without a notation that it was disputed, her attorney sent another letter reminding the defendant that the debt was being contested.
- The plaintiff then filed suit, alleging violations of the defendant violated Sections 1692e(8) of the FDCPA, which prohibits failing to report a disputed debt as disputed, and Section 1692f, which prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection practices.
- The defendant sought to have the case dismissed, arguing the plaintiff did not suffer a concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing.
The ruling: Judge Eric F. Melgren of the District Court for the District of Kansas ruled that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to establish standing. While the defendant claimed the plaintiff’s harm was speculative, the court found the time, effort, and expense incurred in having to send a second dispute letter constituted a tangible injury.
- Citing similar rulings from the Eighth and Seventh Circuits, Judge Melgren wrote that courts have “determined that allegations of extra time, effort, and expense sufficiently allege a tangible injury in fact to satisfy Article III standing.” He referenced Ebaugh v. Medicredit (2025) and Mack v. Resurgent Capital Services (2023), noting that in both cases, postage costs and time spent responding to an FDCPA violation were enough to establish concrete harm.
- In this case, the plaintiff’s additional correspondence was “caused by the FDCPA violation” and “necessary to reassert her rights,” the court found. The ruling concluded that “because Plaintiff alleges that she spent additional time, effort, and expense informing Defendant (a second time) that her debt was disputed, she alleges a tangible injury,” sufficient for standing under Article III.
