In order to allege violations of a statute like the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in federal court, a plaintiff must allege that he or she suffered a concrete injury — something objective. In many FDCPA complaints, however, plaintiffs claim to suffer injuries like loss of sleep, emotional distress, and wasted time dealing with the situation. A District Court judge in Florida has granted a defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an FDCPA case, carefully detailing why those claims are not enough to have standing to sue.
The background: The case arose from attempts to collect unpaid medical bills following two urgent care visits. After insurance processed the claims, balances remained, and the creditor and its collection partner sent billing statements and subsequent communications to the plaintiff.
- The plaintiff did not make any payments and did not contact the creditor, the collection agency, or his insurer to dispute the balances directly.
- Instead, the plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of the FDCPA and Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act. He claimed that the collection letters caused him emotional distress, loss of sleep, and wasted time researching his rights and preparing materials for his attorney.
The ruling: Judge Rodolfo A. Ruiz II of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish standing because none of the alleged harms qualified as a concrete injury.
- Addressing the claimed injuries, Judge Ruiz explained that time spent researching whether one might have a lawsuit is not a concrete harm. As he put it, “the time and money that [a plaintiff] spends on the FDCPA lawsuit itself cannot give rise to a concrete injury for Article III standing purposes.”
- Judge Ruiz was equally dismissive of the emotional distress and sleep loss allegations. Citing Eleventh Circuit precedent, the judge noted that confusion, worry, stress, and anxiety, without more, are insufficient to establish standing.
- Importantly for industry participants, the court also rejected the argument that receiving collection letters constituted an intrusion upon seclusion. Unlike unwanted phone calls or text messages, the court found that mailed letters do not closely resemble historically recognized privacy harms.
