A District Court judge in Alabama has granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss claims it violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when it sent a collection letter to the plaintiff, who was represented by an attorney at the time, on the grounds the statute of limitations had expired, denying the plaintiff’s attempt to argue that extraordinary circumstances were involved.
The background: The case stemmed from a June 29, 2023 collection letter mailed to the plaintiff concerning an alleged debt tied to unpaid sorority dues. The plaintiff had retained counsel and directed a prior collector to communicate through the law clinic that was representing the plaintiff. The account was later placed with the defendant, which allegedly knew the plaintiff was represented when it sent its letter.
- The plaintiff claimed the letter on July 1, 2023 caused her to experience anxiety and emotional distress, fearing her counsel had abandoned her because the communication came directly to her instead of through her attorney.
- She filed suit, alleging the defendant violated Section 1692c(a)(2) of the FDCPA, which generally prohibits collectors from communicating directly with consumers known to be represented by counsel.
- Complicating matters, the plaintiff had previously attempted to assert the same FDCPA claim as a third-party complaint in related state court litigation. That claim was struck, and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal. She then filed this standalone federal action in April 2025.
The ruling: Judge Edmund G. Lacour Jr. of the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama first addressed standing, concluding that receipt of a single unwanted collection letter can constitute a concrete injury under Article III because it bears a close relationship to the common-law tort of intrusion upon seclusion Relying on recent Eleventh Circuit precedent involving unwanted communications, the judge rejected the argument that a single letter is too minor to qualify as a cognizable injury.
- However, the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations proved fatal to the plaintiff’s case. Because the alleged violation occurred when the letter was mailed on June 29, 2023, the limitations period expired in June 2024. The plaintiff did not file her federal action until April 2025.
- The plaintiff urged the court to apply equitable tolling, arguing she diligently pursued her rights in state court and that the time taken by the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals constituted an extraordinary intervening circumstance. Judge Lacour disagreed, emphasizing that equitable tolling is a “rare” and “extraordinary” remedy and requires circumstances both extraordinary and beyond the litigant’s control.
- Crucially, the judge noted that just days before the limitations period expired, the plaintiff chose to appeal the dismissal of her third-party complaint rather than file a separate action. That tactical decision, the court explained, was neither extraordinary nor beyond her control. Even if strategically reasonable, it did not justify tolling.
