When it comes to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and text messages, the bar for standing is very low, one pro se plaintiff is learning, after a Magistrate Court judge in California recommended denying a motion to remand a TCPA and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act case back to state court.
The background: The plaintiff originally filed the lawsuit in California state court, alleging that the defendant violated both the TCPA and the FDCPA and seeking $10,000 in statutory damages.
- After the defendant removed the case to federal court, the plaintiff moved to remand the case back to state court. The argument was not that the claims did not belong in federal court, but rather that the plaintiff had not alleged a “concrete, particularized injury-in-fact,” and therefore lacked standing under Article III.
- The plaintiff attempted to draw a distinction between alleging a statutory violation and alleging actual harm, relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. He argued that simply seeking statutory damages under the TCPA and FDCPA, without more, should not be enough to establish standing.
- The defendant pushed back, arguing that the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that alleging receipt of unsolicited communications in violation of the TCPA is itself a concrete injury sufficient to establish standing.
The ruling: Judge Dennis M. Cota of the District Court for the Eastern District of California agreed with the defendant and recommended denying the motion to remand.
- Relying on recent Ninth Circuit precedent, the court emphasized that “the receipt of unsolicited phone calls or text messages in violation of the TCPA is a concrete injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing.”
- The judge went further, tying that reasoning to FDCPA claims as well, noting that alleged statutory violations that implicate privacy interests can constitute actual harm. In quoting prior case law, the court highlighted that such communications “inherently violated [the plaintiff’s] privacy” and therefore are not merely “a ‘conjectural’ harm or ‘bare procedural violation.’”
- Importantly for operators, Judge Cota rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish between different provisions of the FDCPA, stating there was “no factual or legal reason” why the standing analysis would differ depending on which section was allegedly violated.
