A State Court judge in New Jersey has denied a motion to dismiss a Hunstein lawsuit, ruling that because letter vendors are not specifically mentioned in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as an exempted entity, any alleged communications between the defendant and the vendor it uses are not exempt, either. In doing so, the court embraced a strict, plain-language interpretation of Section 1692c(b) and signaled that, at least in New Jersey state court, the long-debated “letter vendor” theory remains very much alive despite federal courts largely sidestepping the issue on standing grounds.
The background: The case stems from the defendant’s attempt to collect on an unpaid credit card debt. After collection efforts began, the plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendant violated the FDCPA by transmitting her personal and account information to a third-party letter vendor. The defendant shared details such as the plaintiff’s name, address, partial account number, and balance due so the vendor could generate and mail a collection letter.
- The procedural history adds some nuance. A prior judge had required the plaintiff to provide a more definite statement of her claims, specifically around the alleged vendor communications. When the plaintiff did not immediately amend, the defendant moved to dismiss. The plaintiff responded with a motion to amend the complaint with more detailed allegations regarding the vendor relationship.
- The court ultimately allowed the amendment and considered whether the updated complaint stated a viable FDCPA claim.
The ruling: Judge Gregory L. Acquaviva’s analysis focused squarely on the statutory text of Section 1692c(b), which broadly prohibits debt collectors from communicating about a debt with “any person” other than a narrowly defined set of exceptions. The judge emphasized that letter vendors are not among those exceptions and declined to read any implied exemption into the statute.
- Judge Acquaviva framed the issue in simple terms: “Because a letter vendor is not an enumerated, exempted entity… the alleged communication here is not exempt. Period.”
- Rejecting the defendant’s arguments, the judge found that a plain reading of the statute controls, even if it leads to operational challenges for the industry. The opinion dismissed the idea that using a vendor for “ministerial” tasks changes the analysis, noting there is no “de minimis” exception in the statute for minor or routine disclosures.
- The judge also pushed back on attempts to characterize the vendor as merely a “medium” of communication rather than a “person,” stating that common understanding limits “medium” to channels like mail or telephone, not third-party companies.
- Judge Acquaviva acknowledged that federal courts have dismissed similar claims, but largely on standing grounds rather than on the merits of statutory interpretation. That distinction allowed the court to diverge from the federal trend and address the underlying legal question directly.
