A District Court judge in Florida has partially granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act lawsuit that centered on two weekday communications, finding that while the plaintiff plausibly alleged harm, she failed to sufficiently plead that a qualifying “communication” actually occurred under the statute. The decision highlights an important distinction for collection operations: alleging that contact occurred at an inconvenient time is not enough on its own if the nature of the communication itself is not clearly established.
The background: The case arose after the plaintiff received two communications from the defendant related to a medical debt. The plaintiff subsequently informed the defendant that weekday communications were inconvenient and that she was only available on weekends.
- The plaintiff alleged that the defendant then contacted her again on two separate weekdays in early January 2026 in an effort to collect the debt. She claimed these contacts violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on communicating at a time known to be inconvenient to the consumer.
- The plaintiff also alleged that these communications caused her emotional distress, disrupted her daily activities, and resulted in lost time and focus.
- The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing both that the plaintiff lacked standing and that the complaint failed to state a claim.
The ruling: Judge John Antoon II of the District Court for the Middle District of Florida first addressed standing and sided with the plaintiff. He found that allegations of emotional distress, wasted time, and disruption to daily life were sufficient, at least at the pleading stage, to establish a “concrete” injury. The judge pointed to precedent recognizing that even relatively intangible harms, such as time spent dealing with unwanted collection activity, can satisfy Article III requirements.
- However, the court reached a different conclusion on whether the plaintiff adequately stated an FDCPA claim. The key issue was the lack of detail about the alleged communications.
- The judge emphasized that the plaintiff did not specify what type of communication she received, such as whether it was a phone call, voicemail, letter, or other medium. Instead, the complaint relied on the general assertion that she received “weekday communications.”
- That, the court explained, was not enough. As the order notes, “the allegation that there was a ‘communication,’ without more, is insufficient to state a claim for violation of the FDCPA.”
- Because the FDCPA requires an actual “communication” as defined under the statute, the absence of factual detail prevented the court from determining whether the alleged conduct fell within its scope. [EDITOR’S NOTE: In an amended complaint, the plaintiff claimed the two communications were voicemails that were left for her by the defendant. The defendant has moved to have the amended complaint dismissed.]
