A District Court judge in Washington, D.C., has denied a pro se plaintiff’s bid to undo the dismissal of his Fair Debt Collection Practices Act lawsuit, rejecting his claims that the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction and a denial of due process.
The background: The motion sought to reopen a case that had already been dismissed.
- The defendant contacted the plaintiff in early 2023 to collect a $250 utility debt and reported the account to a credit reporting agency.
- The plaintiff sent a cease-and-desist letter, later accused the defendant of violating the FDCPA by continuing to report the debt, and filed suit in D.C. court, which the defendant removed to federal court.
- The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding it too vague to state a claim.
- Last December, the plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing the judgment was void.
- He contended that defense counsel never properly entered an appearance, which in his view made the removal defective and stripped the court of jurisdiction; that he was never served with the motion to dismiss; and that he never consented to a magistrate judge’s authority.
The ruling: Judge Loren L. Alikhan of the District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion, explaining that relief under the rule is reserved for the rare case of a jurisdictional error or a due process violation that deprives a party of notice or a chance to be heard.
- Defense counsel did properly enter an appearance, the judge wrote, because the attorney’s name appeared on the notice of removal, the first paper the defendant filed.
- Even if counsel had slipped up, Judge Alikhan noted, noncompliance with a local court rule does not raise a jurisdictional problem.
- On service, the judge found the motion was mailed to the plaintiff’s last known address, and that any delay did not matter because the plaintiff filed a timely opposition. As she put it, “due process does not require actual notice.”
- The plaintiff argued for the first time in his reply that the certification of service was false because he received letters in February and April but none in March. The judge was unpersuaded. “As a matter of basic logic,” she wrote, evidence that letters arrived in February and April is not evidence that none was sent in March.
- The plaintiff’s final argument also went nowhere. His claim that the court lacked jurisdiction because he never consented to a magistrate judge, the judge wrote, “fails because the undersigned is not a magistrate judge.”
